ICP 7 Corporate Governance

The supervisor requires insurers to establish and implement a corporate governance framework which provides for sound and prudent management and oversight of the insurer’s business and adequately recognises and protects the interests of policyholders.


Appropriate allocation of oversight and management responsibilities


7.1

The supervisor requires the insurer’s Board to:
  • ensure that the roles and responsibilities allocated to the Board, Senior Management and Key Persons in Control Functions are clearly defined so as to promote an appropriate separation of the oversight function from the management responsibilities; and
  • provide oversight of the Senior Management.


Corporate culture, business objectives and strategies of the insurer


7.2

The supervisor requires the insurer’s Board to set and oversee the implementation of the insurer’s corporate culture, business objectives and strategies for achieving those objectives, in line with the insurer’s long term interests and viability.


Structure and governance of the Board


7.3

The supervisor requires the insurer’s Board to have, on an ongoing basis:
  • an appropriate number and mix of individuals to ensure that there is an overall adequate level of competence at the Board level commensurate with the governance structure;
  • appropriate internal governance practices and procedures to support the work of the Board in a manner that promotes the efficient, objective and independent judgment and decision making by the Board; and
  • adequate powers and resources to be able to discharge its duties fully and effectively.


Board composition


7.3.1    

The Board of an insurer should have a sufficient number of members who have relevant expertise among them as necessary to provide effective leadership, direction and oversight of the insurer’s business to ensure it is conducted in a sound and prudent manner. For this purpose, the Board should collectively and individually have, and continue to maintain, including through training, necessary skills, knowledge and understanding of the insurer’s business to be able to fulfil their roles. In particular, the Board should have, or have access to, knowledge and understanding of areas such as the lines of insurance underwritten by the insurer, actuarial and underwriting risks, finance, accounting, the role of control functions, investment analysis and portfolio management and obligations relating to fair treatment of customers. While certain areas of expertise may lie in some, but not all, members, the collective Board should have an adequate spread and level of relevant competencies and understanding as appropriate to the insurer's business.

CF 7.3.a    

The group-wide supervisor requires that the collective competence of the IAIG Board includes an understanding of at least: 
  • the group-wide corporate governance framework and corporate structure; 
  • the activities of the legal entities within the IAIG, including associated risks; 
  • the supervisory regimes applicable to the IAIG;
  • the issues that arise from cross-border business and international transactions; and 
  • the risk management, compliance, audit, actuarial and related areas.

CF 7.3.a.1    

The IAIG Board should be capable of understanding and describing the purpose, structure, strategy, material operations, and material risks of the IAIG, including those of legal entities in other financial sectors and unregulated legal entities that are part of the group.

7.3.2    

Board Members should have the commitment necessary to fulfil their roles, demonstrated by, for example, a sufficient allocation of time to the affairs of the insurer and reasonable limits on the number of Board Memberships held within or outside the insurance group.



Board effectiveness


7.3.3    

The Board should review, at least annually, its own performance to ascertain whether members collectively and individually remain effective in discharging the respective roles and responsibilities assigned to them and identify opportunities to improve the performance of the Board as a whole. The Board should implement appropriate measures to address any identified inadequacies, including any training programmes for Board Members. The Board may also consider the use of external expertise from time to time to undertake its performance assessment where appropriate in order to enhance the objectivity and integrity of that assessment process.



Internal governance


7.3.4    

The Board should have appropriate practices and procedures for its own internal governance, and ensure that these are followed and periodically reviewed to assess their effectiveness and adequacy. These may be included in organisational rules or by-laws, and should set out how the Board will carry out its roles and responsibilities. They should also cover a formal and documented process for nomination, selection and removal of Board Members, and a specified term of office as appropriate to the roles and responsibilities of the Board member, particularly to ensure the objectivity of decision making and judgment. Appropriate succession planning should also form part of the Board’s internal governance practices.



Chair of the Board


7.3.5    

While the Board as a whole remains collectively responsible for the stewardship of the insurer, the Chair of the Board has the pivotal role of providing leadership to the Board for its proper and effective functioning. The role of the Chair of the Board should generally encompass responsibilities such as setting the Board’s agenda, ensuring that there is adequate time allocated for the discussion of agenda items, especially if they involve strategic or policy decisions of significant importance, and promoting a culture of openness and debate by facilitating effective participation of non-executive and executive members and communication between them and also with the Senior Management and Key Persons in Control Functions. To promote checks and balances, it is good practice for the Chair of the Board to be a non-executive Board member and not serve as chair of any Board committee. In jurisdictions where the Chair of the Board is permitted to assume executive duties, the insurer should have measures in place to mitigate any adverse impact on the insurer's checks and balances.



Board committees


7.3.6    

To support the effective discharge of the responsibilities of the Board, the Board should assess whether the establishment of committees of the Board is appropriate. Committees that a Board may commonly establish include audit, remuneration, ethics/compliance, nominations and risk management committees. Where committees are appointed, they should have clearly defined mandates and working procedures (including reporting to the Board), authority to carry out their respective functions, and a degree of independence and objectivity as appropriate to the role of the committee. The Board should consider occasional rotation of members and of the chairs of committees, or tenure limits to serve on a committee, as this can help to avoid undue concentration of power and promote fresh perspectives. If the functions of any committees are combined, the Board should ensure such a combination does not compromise the integrity and/or effectiveness of the functions combined. In all cases, the Board remains



Independence and objectivity


7.3.7    

To promote objectivity in decision making by the Board, the formal and perceived independence of Board Members should be ensured. To that end, Board Members should avoid personal ties or financial or business interests which conflict with that of the insurer. Where it is not reasonably possible to avoid conflicts of interests, such conflicts should be managed. Documented procedures and policies should be in place to identify and address conflicts of interests which could include disclosure of potential conflicts of interests, requirements for arm’s length transactions, abstention of voting and, where appropriate, prior approval by the Board or shareholders of professional positions or transactions.


7.3.8    

Besides policies on conflicts of interests, the insurer should ensure objectivity in decision making by establishing clear and objective independence criteria which should be met by an adequate number of members of the Board (ie non-executive Board Members). For this purpose, the independence criteria should also take account of group structures and other applicable factors. Meeting such criteria is particularly important for those Board Members undertaking specific roles (such as members of the remuneration and audit committees) in which conflicts of interests are more likely to arise.


7.3.9    

Objectivity in decision making is also promoted by independence of mind of the individual Board Members. This means that a Board member should act without favour; provide constructive and robust challenge of proposals and decisions; ask for information when the member judges it necessary in the light of the issues; and avoid “group-think”.


7.3.10    

Board Members should also bear in mind the duties of good faith and loyalty applicable to them at the individual level, as set out in Standard 7.4.

CF 7.3.b    

The group-wide supervisor requires the IAIG Board to ensure that the group-wide corporate governance framework includes policies and processes to identify and avoid, or manage, conflicts of interest that may adversely affect the IAIG as a whole or any of its legal entities.

CF 7.3.b.1    

Conflicts of interest within an IAIG could arise:
  • at the level of the Board, Senior Management and Key Persons in Control Functions of the Head of the IAIG and of its legal entities; and
  • among the interests of the legal entities, or between the group-wide interests and those of any legal entity. For example, when the IAIG may be harmed by actions of insurance legal entities within the IAIG, or when an insurance legal entity within the IAIG may be harmed by the actions of the IAIG.

CF 7.3.b.2    

Where conflicts of interest involving individuals or legal entities cannot be avoided, the relevant individuals or legal entities should inform the relevant Board or the IAIG Board of the conflict and take measures to mitigate its adverse impact.


Board powers


7.3.11    

To be able to discharge its role and responsibilities properly, the Board should have well-defined powers, which are clearly set out either in legislation and/or as part of the constituent documents of the insurer (such as the constitution, articles of incorporation, by-laws or internal/organisational rules). These should, at least, include the power to obtain timely and comprehensive information relating to the management of the insurer, including direct access to relevant persons within the organisation for obtaining information, such as Senior Management and Key Persons in Control Functions.


Access to resources


7.3.12    

Adequate resources, such as sufficient funding, staff and facilities, should be allocated to the Board to enable the Board Members to carry out their respective roles and responsibilities efficiently and effectively. The Board should have access to services of external consultants or specialists where necessary or appropriate, subject to criteria (such as independence) and due procedures for appointment and dismissal of such consultants or specialists.


Delegations


7.3.13    

The Board may delegate some of the activities or tasks associated with its own roles and responsibilities. (Delegations in this context are distinguished from outsourcing of business activities by the insurer, which is dealt with in ICP 8 Risk Management and Internal Controls.) Notwithstanding such delegations, the Board as a whole retains the ultimate responsibility for the activities or tasks delegated, and the decisions made in reliance on any advice or recommendations made by the persons or committees to whom the tasks were delegated.


7.3.14    

Where the Board makes any delegations, it should ensure that:
  • the delegation is appropriate. Any delegation that results in the Board not being able to discharge its own roles and responsibilities effectively would be an undue or inappropriate delegation. For example, the duty to oversee the Senior Management should not be delegated to a Board committee comprised mostly or solely of executive members of the Board who are involved in the day-to-day management of the insurer;
  • the delegation is made under a clear mandate with well-defined terms such as those relating to the powers, accountabilities and procedures relating to the delegation, and is supported by adequate resources to effectively carry out the delegated functions;
  • there is no undue concentration of powers giving any one person or group of individuals an unfettered and inappropriate level of powers capable of influencing the insurer’s business or management decisions;
  • it has the ability to monitor and require reports on whether the delegated tasks are properly carried out; and
  • it retains the ability to withdraw the delegation if it is not discharged properly and for due purposes by the delegate, and, for this purpose, have appropriate contingency arrangements in place.
 

Duties of individual Board members


7.4

The supervisor requires that an individual member of the Board:
  • act in good faith, honestly and reasonably;
  • exercise due care and diligence;
  • act in the best interests of the insurer and policyholders, putting those interests ahead of his/her own interests;
  • exercise independent judgment and objectivity in his/her decision making, taking due account of the interests of the insurer and policyholders; and
  • not use his/her position to gain undue personal advantage or cause any detriment to the insurer.


Duties related to risk management and internal controls


7.5

The supervisor requires the insurer’s Board to provide oversight in respect of the design and implementation of risk management and internal controls.


Duties related to remuneration


7.6

The supervisor requires the insurer’s Board to:
  • adopt and oversee the effective implementation of a written remuneration policy for the insurer, which does not induce excessive or inappropriate risk taking, is in line with the corporate culture, objectives, strategies, identified risk appetite, and long term interests of the insurer, and has proper regard to the interests of its policyholders and other stakeholders; and
  • ensure that such a remuneration policy, at least, covers those individuals who are members of the Board, Senior Management, Key Persons in Control Functions and other employees whose actions may have a material impact on the risk exposure of the insurer (major risk–taking staff).


Reliable and transparent financial reporting


7.7

The supervisor requires the insurer’s Board to ensure there is a reliable financial reporting process for both public and supervisory purposes that is supported by clearly defined roles and responsibilities of the Board, Senior Management and the external auditor.


External Audit


7.8

The supervisor requires the insurer's Board to ensure that there is adequate governance and oversight of the external audit process.


Communications


7.9

The supervisor requires the insurer’s Board to have systems and controls to ensure appropriate, timely and effective communications with the supervisor on the governance of the insurer.


Duties of Senior Management


7.10

The supervisor requires the insurer to ensure that Senior Management:
  • carries out the day-to-day operations of the insurer effectively and in accordance with the insurer’s corporate culture, business objectives and strategies for achieving those objectives in line with the Insurer's long term interests and viability;
  • promotes sound risk management, compliance and fair treatment of customers;
  • provides the Board adequate and timely information to enable the Board to carry out its duties and functions including the monitoring and review of the performance and risk exposures of the insurer, and the performance of Senior Management; and
  • maintains adequate and orderly records of the internal organisation.


Supervisory review


7.11

The supervisor requires the insurer to demonstrate the adequacy and effectiveness of its corporate governance framework.